The 'Singapore Model' has constituted the only second explicit attempt by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to learn from a foreign country following Mao Zedong's pledge to contour 'China's tomorrow' on the Soviet Union experience during the early 1950s. This paper critically evaluates policy transfers from Singapore to China in the post-Mao era. It reexamines how this Sino-Singaporean regulatory engagement came about historically following Deng Xiaoping's visit to Singapore in 1978, and offers a careful re-reading of the degree to which actual policy borrowing by China could transcend different state ideologies, abstract ideas and subjective attitudes. Particular focus is placed on the effects of CPC cadre training in Singapore universities and policy mutation within two government-to-government projects, namely the Suzhou Industrial Park and the Tianjin Eco-City. The paper concludes that the 'Singapore Model', as applied in post-Mao China, casts institutional reforms as an open-ended process of policy experimentation and adaptation that is fraught with tension and resistance.
Introduction
Much has been made of the significance of the 1992 'southern tour' of the-then 'Paramount Leader' of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Deng Xiaoping, in instituting a new round of socioeconomic reforms in China. Relatively underplayed but not lacking in historical significance was his 'southern tour' of Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in November 1978. Recounting this visit, the former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, described Deng's tour "shocked him [Deng] because he expected three backward cities. Instead he saw three modern cities and he knew that communism -the politics of the iron rice bowldid not work" 1 . This "shock" jumpstarted a deepening engagement with the regulatory regime in Singapore, previously labelled the "running dog of imperialism" (diguozhuyi zougou 帝国主 义走狗) by the CPC propagandistic machine. Delegations began to visit Singapore informally in the 1980s, including Jiang Zemin, who succeeded Deng as China's next leader, and a 'Singapore fever' (xinjiapo re 新加坡热) quickly developed across Chinese policymaking circles after Deng's imploration to CPC cadres in 1992: "Learn from the world, especially from Singapore. There is good social order there. They govern with discipline. We should draw from their experience -and we will do even better than they." 2 More delegations were deployed to Singapore in the 1990s. The current Chinese president, Xi Jinping, went on one of these visits as a city-level official. A bilateral agreement was signed in February 1994 in Beijing to facilitate expertise transfer in the realm of urban and industrial management -portrayed by Singaporean policymakers as a government-togovernment (G-to-G) 'software transfer' -to the ancient city of Suzhou. Subsequent G-to-G collaborations were launched in Tianjin (2008) and Chongqing (2015) . The regulatory engagement became further institutionalized with the signing of two agreements in 1997 and 2001 to facilitate short attachments to key regulatory agencies in Singapore and longer-term enrolment in Master-degree programs offered by the Nanyang Technological University 1 SPIEGEL 2005. Interview with Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew: "It's stupid to be afraid". 8 August.
Ref. To 1981 . 2 Deng 1993, 378-379. (NTU) and the National University of Singapore (NUS). More recently, the CPC's enchantment with Singaporean neo-authoritarianism appears to have transcended the domains of urban public administration and industrial policy. This is interesting -if not also surprising -as it comes after reported concerns about the "cracks in the Singapore model" following the ruling People's Action Party's (PAP) weakest ever electoral performance in 2011 3 . With the PAP's landslide electoral victory of September 2015 suggesting it managed to reduce the socioeconomic problems that triggered a loss of confidence in its governance, it appears there are new lessons to be drawn on addressing social discontent. This paper evaluates the emergence and effects of lesson drawing and policy transfers from Singapore to China in the post-Mao era. It has two objectives. First, it reexamines how this Sino-Singaporean regulatory engagement -only the second overt attempt to learn from a particular country after Mao Zedong pledged during the 1950s to contour 'China's tomorrow' on the Soviet Union prototype -came to be. Second, the paper provides a twofold evaluation of the concrete policies and ideas drawn from Singapore. It begins by assessing the CPC's annual cadre training and exchange programs through critical observations from Chinese scholars and policymakers. The constraints of implementing G-to-G policy transfers are then illustrated through a critical review of policymakers' comments and existing research on the Suzhou and Tianjin G-to-G 'software transfers'.
Placed within a broad historical framework, this spectrum of evidence shows how Singaporean-derived lessons and policies mutated when rolled out across Chinese shores.
Indeed, inflows of ideas and policies continue to be refracted -if at times actively resistedby all levels of the party-state apparatus. At one level, this reinforces Huff's contention that the Singaporean experience "is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, not only because the Republic is a city-state, but also because few others can develop services exports reliant on location, because of the unacceptability in many other polities of a heavy foreign economic presence, and because of difficulties in effecting the same degree of government control as in Singapore." 4 At another level, the mutation and, in the case of the G-to-G projects, territorial containment of policies, ideas and philosophies from Singapore reinforces Shambaugh's observation that foreign ideas/practices have been proactively re-adapted to local contexts in China 5 . Viewed as an aggregated process over time, however, existing research remains unclear whether the overt 'learning' engagements with Singapore-based institutions and firms are of more political rather than practical value for current and future rounds of institutional reforms across China. This paper will address this lacuna.
The discussion is organized in four parts. Section 2 reviews extant research on lesson drawing and policy transfers and establishes the conceptual parameters that frame the empirical analysis. The geographical-historical conditions that underpinned the ChinaSingapore strategic engagement are presented in section 3. Section 4 lists and evaluates the different dimensions of Sino-Singaporean lesson drawing and policy transfers over the past three decades. The relationship between policy mutation and Chinese policymakers' persistence in learning from the Singaporean experience is assessed in the conclusion.
Conceptualizing lesson drawing and policy transfers
National policymaking is a multi-dimensional and an increasingly cross-border process. This phenomenon is widely connoted by the concepts of 'lesson drawing' and 'policy transfer'.
Rose identifies five different degrees of 'lesson drawing'. Copying is the "adoption more or less intact of a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction" 6 . It does not consider cultural, historic and socio-political contexts that could be highly variegated within and between countries. A step removed from copying, emulation involves adapting foreign policies to domestic conditions. Hybridization is a "combination of elements of programmes from two different places" 7 . Inspiration is not directly linked to drawing lessons; rather, policies implemented elsewhere are used as stimuli for formulating new domestic programs. 4 Huff 1995a, 753. 5 Shambaugh (2008: 103); cf. de Jong (2013) . 6 Rose, 1991 , 22. 7 Rose, 1991 These five degrees constitute varying dimensions through which ideas, policies, institutions and ideologies move between places. Within our own countries we must continue to fight our communists because in every one of the ASEAN countries the people have made it abundantly clear that Communism is not for them. But outside of ASEAN the question of whether a government is or is not Communist is irrelevant. The only test is whether it is friendly or unfriendly; whether it is under a compulsion to liberate us from ourselves or leave it to each of us to seek the better life our own way…I think today and in the future great powers will seek friends and allies not on the basis of increasingly irrelevant ideological affinities but on the basis of national interests.
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This shift from ideological internationalism to political realism established the platform for a "friendly" Deng Xiaoping to launch the previously mentioned visit to Southeast Asia in 1978.
The Singapore media, as was Lee Kuan Yew in several subsequent interviews, was keen to portray Deng's visit as an eye-opening experience (ref. I went to Singapore to understand aspects of how they utilized foreign capital. Foreigners established factories in Singapore and Singaporeans reaped several benefits…We must develop this resolve, weigh and be clear about the pros and cons, and do it even if it means suffering some minor losses.
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25 Rajaratnam, 1977 . 26 Deng 1994 authors' translation; cf. Chen 2007 . University -the use of Chinese-language syllabi for advanced studies outside Chinaalmost four decades after its establishment.
As enrolment in these courses expanded, NTU developed the first overseas Master's programme for higher-ranked Chinese officials in 1998. While the medium of instruction for most courses in NTU is English, the two Masters programs for Chinese officials -namely the Context is an important factor to consider when learning from Singapore. More than 50,000 government officials have been trained in Singapore over the past 20 years. This is a considerable figure; on average every township would have an official who has been to Singapore. Yet it has been more than 20 years since the first batch of officials returned from Singapore, and the impact of 'learning' is not at all clear. Why is it that so many officials were sent in search of 'holy scriptures' (qujing 取经) for dissemination at home, only to have them return and revert to their old ways?
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Zheng Yongnian, a Singapore-based political analyst of China-Singapore relations, offers a similar observation:
Take the social housing construction in China for instance, it is an example of failed learning from Singapore. Although housing reforms in China are always portrayed as learning from Singapore's housing institution, that is to allow the majority of the people to buy their own housing, in practice what goes on is land-financed development, it is to rule through real estate development. In global city-states, the (national) state has virtually direct access to the global economy. State policies can be shaped to develop the city-state into a global city-state…the political power and control of a developmental city-state distinguishes it from municipal governments in most global cities because it is able to bypass national-state/provincial-city politics typical in many global cities. . Uniting these two camps, Fei argues, is a distinct lack of interest in the Singaporean experience, but rather a tendency to advance inward-looking agendas through making references to Singapore. This further explains why lessons and policies drawn from Singapore mutated after reaching China.
G-to-G projects: are geographically-targeted policy transfers effective?
Apart from academic-based learning, specific policy transfers were and continue to be . Shortly after this interview, Lee elaborated on the Singapore pullback:
We would have liked to stay, but not in the way events have developed. It isn't worth our while to go on with it and have constant friction. And it's not just over costs -it's over ways of doing things…The problem was to change work styles, work habits and systems. So, I think it's best that they decide what to pick and choose and adapt to their systems.
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The friction was officially resolved in 2001. The Singapore consortium lowered its stake to 35%, raised the Chinese consortium's stake to 65%, and reduced its involvement in the construction from a planned 70 km 2 to just 8 km 2
. Yet a part of Lee arguably felt point-topoint transfer and subsequent nationwide adaptation was possible had the Chinese central government ensured the project received absolute "special attention" 61 . This setback triggered reflections by key Singaporean policymakers involved in the project, which in turn revealed the difficulties confronting CPC attempts at emulating, hybridizing or transplanting policies from Singapore. To George Yeo, the-then Singapore Minister for Trade and Industry, the primary impediment of successful policy transfers was cultural differences:
57 For Lim and Chan Soo Sen, the first CEO of CS-SIP, differences in perceptions of contracts and policies -and by extension, the rule of law -were a major issue:
The way we look at a contract or an agreement is quite different from how the Chinese look at it. Once signed, we have every intention to stick to the contract but they don't. They are quite happy to come back and see what they can do to re-negotiate some terms or to get out of some obligations. But you can't change the Chinese mentality and Chinese system overnight 63 .
In Singapore, policies are very explicit, down to the last detail. But China is too big. If a policy is too explicit and not open to interpretation, it becomes useless because every province will have exceptions and need to be exempted at different points. Therefore, Chinese policies are more general. Far better to state the spirit of the policy rather than to document the exact details.
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Of particular interest is the gradual success of the SIP after the Singapore-based firms Launched against a backdrop of acute environmental pollution and income inequality, the Tianjin Eco-City project represents an ongoing concern with environmentally unsustainable urbanization. Recounting the formation of this project, former Singaporean PM Goh explains:
China at that time was emphasising the environment, green development, urbanisation without too much pollution. So, we had the expertise in Singapore, so I was able to align our expertise with China's interest of wanting to have a clean environment for its urbanisation. By the time the public housing project is completed, many of us Tianjin officials would likely be promoted elsewhere. Who would still be around to ensure that it is really the poor people who are relocated to this public housing estate?
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As an unnamed staff member of SSTEC adds, policy transfers could succeed only if they were aligned to local officials' agendas:
We have very strong high-level government links -but not with officials at the lower and provincial levels. It's the Tianjin officials' support we need to get things done -be it focusing only on green projects, building a light-rail transit line in the Eco-City or creating a community mix of different income groups. Table   1 ).
On the one hand, this multi-faceted attempt at learning from the 'Singapore model'
indicates an underlying belief that place-specific policies are transferable in different forms. It recalibrates notions of 'Chinese exceptionalism' by showing how the dynamic interaction with foreign policies and practices constituted post-Mao reforms. On the other hand, enduring institutional aspects of the Chinese experience arguably became more pronounced after overt and tacit attempts to learn from Singapore. As Table 1 success since the mid-1960s are arguably secondary considerations 78 . What matters is the appearance that change is coming; that change is not directionless but 'modelled' after global best practices. During the late Qing era, the 'model' was Japan; the Soviet Union represented 'China's tomorrow' to the Mao administration; for Deng and his successors, the explicit 'modelling' focus has shifted to Singapore, a city-state in Southeast Asia no bigger than Shunyi district of Beijing.
